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Professor Blas Radi’s article, “Epistemic Responsibility and Culpable Ignorance: About 
Editorial and Peer Review in Practical Philosophy” (2021), presents an interesting series of 
problems and proposals as a reaction to a particularly defective article on gender questions 
published by Dianoia. While I agree with Radi’s overall strategy and with his demands for a 
more serious approach to trans questions, I believe that the core of his disagreement with 
Córdoba cannot be reduced to a “culpable ignorance” committed by the latter, but hinges, 
instead, on a dispute about whether or not the behavior of trans people that appeal to 
biomedical practices can be interpreted as “autonomous” or “dependent”.  
 
Section 1: Outline 
 
The text will proceed as follows: 
 
In Section 2, I will attempt a reconstruction of my own of the article that Radi criticizes, 
that is, Professor Córdoba’s “Identities that Matter” (2020). As I will try to show, it is not 
clear that the alleged “paradox” that the article tackles even exists, unless Córdoba's remark 
about this “paradox” is completed with an argument that extrapolates the “regressive” 
character of forced medical interventions on intersex bodies in order to describe the voluntary 
transformation of their bodies that trans people undergo. As I will argue, this argument 
commits a petitio principii against the possibility that trans people have an autonomous 
relationship with biomedical practices. 
 
In Section 3, I will try show how Professor Radi’s reply to Córdoba coincides, grosso modo, 
with the one I have proposed. According to Radi, the key problem in Córdoba’s approach 
resides in the fact that she seems to ignore the evidence that trans people make an 
“instrumental use” of the practices that medicine offers. Córdoba’s approach, then, could be 
described simply as a case of culpable ignorance. 
 
In Section 4, however, I will point out that the problem at stake here can be deeper than 
simple ignorance: in fact, in order to defend the tenet that trans people’s relationship with 
biomedical practices is “instrumental”, Radi needs to rely on a series of reports concerning 
such relationship (such as those that can be found in a seminal article by Sandy Stone), 
whereas a critic as Córdoba could object that those reports cannot be taken at face value—in 
other words, that despite the fact that trans people describe that relationship as an 
autonomous one, the relationship in question is “objectively” one that needs to be described 
in terms of dependence or subjection.  
 
In Section 5, consequently, I will discuss two possible arguments according to which the 
relationship of trans people with medical practices just cannot be autonomous, but a case of 
“dependence”, and none of those arguments, as I will try to show, holds water. If (as it is 
considered in 5.1) the problem with trans people’s modifications of their bodies is the very 
fact that they make use of technologies, this does not make a relevant difference with the 
way in which nearly everyone is currently “dependent on” medicine. If, on the contrary (as it 








presuppositions” concerning what it is to “look like a man” (or a woman), then it is not clear 
at all why this would be different to “yielding” to “binaristic presuppositions” when 
changing one’s name—that is to say, Córdoba’s argument certainly risks proving too much.   
 
In Section 6, I concede that it might be desirable to live in a society in which people are not 
publicly classified as “men” or “women” and in which, therefore, no demand for a specific 
gender-laden appearance can emerge. However, this desideratum still fails to provide a 
concluding support for a rejection of voluntary biomedical interventions that trans people 
perform on their bodies: it is not clear that the inner experience of gender would disappear 
even in a “gender-neutral” society, and, whatever the answer to that question could be, we 
simply do not live in such a society. 
 
Section 2: Professor Córdoba, “Science”, and the Argentinian Gender Identity Law 
 
I begin with a reconstruction of the specific piece Radi criticizes, and of the aspects he 
rejects in it. In her “Identidades que Importan. Trans e Intersex, la ley Argentina y la 
Irrupción de la Ciencia”, professor Mariana Córdoba links “science”, in general (“la ciencia”) 
with a much more specific theoretical element within science: what she calls “the scientific 
principles of sexual dimorphism” which “are usually denounced for repressing, 
normativizing and pathologizing, in particular, intersex bodies” (Córdoba 2020, 31).1  
 
According to Córdoba, the Argentinian Gender Identity Law is “opposed to reducing 
human life to what science allegedly defines” (Córdoba 2020, 38). However, whereas the law 
does not seem, in this way, to “make room for science”, because science is “excluded from 
the identity determinations of gender”, a tension would supposedly emerge insofar as 
“biomedical practices that come to the fore […] presuppose certain theoretical principles, 
both biological and biochemical”, a circumstance that, according to Córdoba, would stand in 
a strained relation with the fact that “struggles for the acknowledgment of gender identity on 
the basis of personal desire […] have been marked by a radical opposition to naturalistic 
essentialisms, to the supposed determination by biology” (Córdoba 2020, 38–39). 
 
2.1 A Paradox that Does Not Exist 
 
In even stronger terms, Córdoba writes:  
 
Medicine holds the power to classify bodies, on the basis of their qualities, as 
healthy/sick, normal/abnormal, typical/anomalous, which is evident in its 
 
1 As is well known, it is a question of debate within science whether or not our species can be described as 
neatly divided between males and females (Cf. Blackless et al., 2000; Fausto-Sterling, 2000); it does not seem 
appropriate, consequently, to speak about “science” or “biology” as monolithic in this point (“la ciencia”, “la 
biología”). As to the alleged “disciplinary” and “normativizing” consequences of “science” in the domain of 
human sexuality, it is an empirical question whether the emergence of biological explanations of human sexual 
behavior tends to have such consequences or, on the contrary, it tends towards a more respectful attitude 
towards diversity. A study concerning the social perception of homosexuality in Sweden supports the second 
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treatment of intersexuality. Biomedical practices play a normativizing role 
when they violently “cure” and “correct” intersexual bodies […] Now, the 
interventions of bio-power on intersexuality and the chirurgical and 
hormonal treatments that the Law of Gender Identity regulates are founded on 
the same scientific knowledge that supports the supposition of sexual dimorphism 
(Córdoba 2020, 41, emphasis added). 
 
According to Córdoba, it would be necessary to tackle a presumed “paradox” that would 
emerge when, on the one hand, certain people consider “regressive” the “intromission of 
biology” in gender issues while, on the other hand, the same people appeal to “certain 
biomedical practices that are based, in the last instance, in biology and biochemistry” (Córdoba 
2020, 41-42, emphasis added). 
 
This analysis is rather baffling. Of course, it would be paradoxical to attempt to expel 
“biology” from any role concerning questions of gender while, at the same time, appealing to 
scientific knowledge in order to guarantee the access of a series of rights. But, before 
“tackling” such an alleged paradox, as Córdoba claims to be doing, it would be important to 
examine whether the paradox even exists; that is, if there are real human beings that support 
the two incompatible attitudes that Córdoba describes. To begin with, for the paradox to 
even emerge, it is necessary to be committed to the overall condemnation of the monolith 
“biology” (or, in some passages, even “science”). However, this rejection seems to be an 
attitude held by Córdoba herself–not by her interlocutors, who, by the way, are mentioned 
only under vague denominations such as “collectives for the sexual-generical dissidences”, or 
“activisms” (Córdoba 2020, 39). 
 
Let us look a little bit closer. Córdoba’s argument seems to be the following: 
 
(1) There are people who recourse to certain biomedical practices that are based in biology 
and biochemistry, and who “even celebrate” such practices; 
 
(2) The people referred to in (1) also “consider as regressive” the “intromission” of 
“biology” in questions of gender; 
 
Therefore,  
(3) The people referred to in (1) have a “paradoxical” position. 
 
The obvious problem is, of course, (2). What is the support for such a claim? A first strategy 
could be to suggest that (2) is supported by another claim, namely, the claim that the activists 
whose positions Córdoba is discussing reject the need to appeal to biology for the specific task 
of determining one’s gender identity, an identity that, according to the Argentinian law, can be 
determined by means of self-perception only. Córdoba enthusiastically celebrates the 
“exclusion” of science from “the […] determinations of gender” (Córdoba 2020, 38) but, of 
course, the determination of gender is one thing and the possibility of intervening one’s own 
body in accordance to the self-perceived gender is another. There can definitely be 








that if we reject an appeal to biology for the determination of gender identity, we must also 
refuse to resort to biology as the scientific foundation for a series of medical practices— 
would be simply a petitio principii against the supporters of the Argentinian law.  
 
2.2 The Argument Concerning Interventions on Intersex Bodies 
 
Nonetheless, Córdoba offers something that can be read as an argument in favor of an 
overall “exclusion” of biology from gender identity questions. In this case, the issue is no 
longer the (trivial) statement that gender activists have defended self-perception, instead of 
medical analysis, as the basis for the attribution of gender identity; Córdoba offers, instead, 
an apparent reason why those activists should reject (as “regressive”) the intervention of 
biology in gender matters. In this way, the paradox described in (3) would emerge if, 
following Córdoba’s reasoning, activists accepted that they should reject such intervention, 
and nevertheless continued to hold the attitudes described in (1). Under this reading, we are 
no longer describing an attitude, as in (2), but suggesting that such attitude should be held–only 
after which a paradox could emerge. What is the argument that is supposed to reach this 
result? Córdoba seems to have in mind something like the following:  
 
(4) The knowledge that supports the assumption of sexual dimorphism is the 
foundation of “the interventions of bio-power on intersexuality”; 
 
(5) Such interventions are regressive; 
 
(6) The knowledge in question is the same knowledge that underlies the voluntary 
modifications of the bodies of trans people; 
 
Therefore,  
(7) The “intromission” of biology in all matters of gender identity (including those 
concerning the voluntary transformations of the body in accordance with self-
perceived identity) is “regressive”. 
 
Córdoba really seems to be committed to an argument of this sort, insofar as she repeatedly 
claims that it is “the same scientific knowledge” which lies at the foundations of both the 
interventions on intersex bodies and the voluntary interventions that the law of gender 
identity regulates (Córdoba 2020, 31, 32, 41). However, it is difficult to perceive the strength 
of this argument–an argument which, again, depends on associating a rejection of one 
practice (the compulsory interventions on the bodies of intersex people) with the rejection 
of another practice (the voluntary treatments carried on by trans people to adapt their bodies). 
How, really, is the regressive character of one practice supposed to “pollute” the other? 
Córdoba proceeds as if the compulsory medical interventions of the bodies of intersex 
people were somehow a consequence of the underlying knowledge, as if this knowledge were a 
sufficient condition for the existence of such interventions and were, consequently, 
inseparable from them. On this basis, Córdoba claims that we cannot vindicate the scientific 
knowledge underlying the transformation of the bodies of trans people without also 
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According to this line of thought, scientific knowledge would somehow manage, by itself, to 
cause violent interventions on the bodies of intersex people. It is knowledge that should be held 
responsible, not a certain application of that knowledge, carried on by certain individuals. The 
distinction between a theoretical content and what people can do on the basis of it would 
somehow be rendered irrelevant. However, erasing this distinction involves, again, a petitio 
principii: if Córdoba is discussing against activists who celebrate the possibility (a possibility, 
not an obligation) of voluntarily modifying their bodies according to a series of scientific 
discoveries (activists whose very lives can in some cases be an example of doing things with 
the results of “science”), what can be the grounds of the author to reject such a possibility, 
and insist on describing the relationship with science in terms that exclude agency and 
freedom? At this point, it is necessary to consider Professor Radi’s reply, and how the debate 
could continue. 
 
Section 3: Professor Radi’s Reply  
 
As I see it, Blas Radi's reply points, broadly, to the same problems I have tried to analyze. He 
asks, rhetorically:  
 
Why would we insist on presenting trans people as subjected to the 
normative standards of science? What would lead us to present the 
development of biomedical technologies as a parallel process independent of 
the agency of trans people? What is the justification for not knowing, as experts, the 
strategies of appropriation and instrumental use that trans people have historically made of 
biomedical technologies (Radi 2021, 2, emphasis added)? 
 
In other words: according to Radi, Córdoba would adopt a rather condescending attitude vis-à-
vis trans people concerning their relation to entities such as “science” and “biomedical 
technologies”—which appear in Córdoba’s view as monolithic and as incontrollable agents, 
with respect to which trans people can either be helpless victims or simply escape. But there 
is something more. Radi not only points out the existence of “instrumental uses” of 
biomedical technologies, but also—and crucially—insists that this existence is something 
that Córdoba, and the reviewers that evaluated her article, should have known. In other words, 
Radi’s criticism is one of culpable ignorance. His main line of attack, then, is at a meta-level: he 
does not discuss Córdoba’s arguments in detail, but, instead, reflects on the conditions of 
epistemic irresponsibility that led to its publication. He presents Córdoba’s “argument that 
seeks to defend” that the Argentinian law “collides with the emancipatory principles it claims 
to uphold” (Radi 2021, 32) and concludes that “only a person who ignores the fields of 
knowledge that are intertwined here […] would allow for such an argument” (Radi 2021, 33). 
 
Whereas Radi takes for granted that only ignorance can account for Córdoba’s neglect of the 
“instrumental use” that trans people make of medical resources, we may need, even from a 
sympathetic view, to explore what the evidence of that “instrumental use” is, and what is 
required to accept it as valuable in this context. I am aware that Radi’s reproach of “culpable 
ignorance” is not limited to the problem of trans people’s “instrumental use” of biomedical 








drugs whose risks Córdoba discusses, and which are not, Radi remarks, those recommended 
in the Argentinian guidelines (Radi 2021, 31). However, I will focus on the specific problem 
of “instrumental use” as key to his argument against Córdoba’s approach to the question of 
medical practices. 
 
Section 4: The Problem of Agency and the Notion of “Instrumental Use” 
 
Without attempting to be exhaustive, I will appeal here to a locus classicus in trans studies, a 
text which suits Radi’s purposes particularly well: Sandy Stone’s “The Empire Strikes Back” 
(Stone 1992).  
 
In this essay, Stone takes up Laub and Gandy’s analysis on how transsexuals who “wanted 
surgery” (Stone 1992, 162) to modify their bodies in accordance to their self-perceived 
gender used to read Harry Benjamin’s book The Transsexual Phenomenon to “provide” medical 
researchers with “the behavior that led to acceptance for surgery” (Stone 1992, 161; Stone 
cites Gandy and Laub 1974, 8–9). This relationship with medical literature and practices does 
not seem to be that of a group of people who are passively subjected to the imperatives of 
“science”: quite on the contrary, what is found there is that trans people who wanted to 
modify their bodies appealed to medical resources as means to their own ends. Now, if Radi 
intends to invoke sources such as Stone to prove his point about an “instrumental use” of 
medical technologies, then his disagreement with Córdoba’s approach seems to hinge on 
two more specific aspects regarding the reliability of trans people: on the one hand, their 
reliability to give a factual account of the relationship between them and the medical 
institution; on the other hand, their right to interpret that relationship in terms of “agency” 
and “instrumental use” (instead of in terms of “subjection” or “subordination”).  
 
Let me begin at what is, arguably, the least controversial level. Radi’s claim that Córdoba’s 
article shows a lack of knowledge about the “instrumental use” of “medical technologies” by 
trans people needs to appeal, at the very least, to the tenet that these trans people are in a 
position to know about their own relationship with such technologies. In other words, Radi’s 
point would have to be that trans people are reliable sources to inform whether or not they, 
for example, adapt their behavior in order to overcome the possible obstacles that separate 
them from their ends. Ignoring the voices of trans people at this level would be as 
impermissible as ignoring any first-hand testimony from the relevantly “situated” subjects in 
any other field of enquiry. 
 
However, it can be argued that the really troublesome level is whether or not trans people’s 
attitude towards certain medical practices can be interpreted as an “instrumental use”. Even if 
we admit the existence of phenomena such as those described by Stone, acknowledging 
those phenomena, and describing them in terms of “instrumental use” are two different 
steps of the analysis; most notably, “instrumental” seems to entail here something like 
“autonomous”. An objector might say that describing the behavior of surgery-seeking trans 
people in such terms is question-begging: Córdoba might insist that “biomedical practices 
[…] turn the very phenomenon of ‘transsexuality’ into something completely dependent on 
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something opposed to autonomy.2 Paraphrasing a bit: if a certain practice makes trans people 
“dependent”, then the pursuit of the means to obtain such a practice cannot be an instance 
of autonomous practice. In this particular case, such a pursuit would be a vindication of a 
series of binary presuppositions that trans people would allegedly have to oppose. 
 
Now, given that Córdoba’s description of the behavior of trans people as “dependent” in 
opposition to “instrumental” (and therefore autonomous) is a way to interpret certain data, we 
need to discuss what the criteria employed are.  
 
Section 5: Criteria of Autonomy and Dependence 
 
5. 1 The General Argument Concerning “Dependence on Medicine”  
 
When speaking about an “instrumental use” of medical technologies, we assume that the 
subjects involved have certain ends and seek the appropriate means to achieve them; 
Córdoba, however, could retort that the ends themselves can be questioned, insofar as those 
ends push people to a situation of “dependence”. Now, why should we accept this move 
from “ends that trans people have” to “ends that trans people should have”? If there are trans 
individuals who consciously want to transform their bodies, what exactly can be an argument to 
say that they should not have such a desire?  
 
If the argument is simply that the desire to transform one’s body is something that can only 
be achieved by medical assistance, and as such involves a loss of autonomy (just because the 
means are something “external” to the individuals themselves), then it obviously proves too 
much: anyone who makes use of “medical technologies”, for instance to get a cancer 
operated on, correct their poor eyesight with glasses or treat a depression with pills would 
also be “completely dependent on medicine” and consequently fall short of a Stoic ideal of 
independence. Yes—so what? Córdoba should show that there is something worse in the 
“dependance” created by the surgical and pharmacological interventions that trans people 
seek than in the parallel “dependance” that the other cases involve. 
 
5.2 The Specific Argument Concerning “Binaristic Presuppositions” 
 
At this point, predictably, an objector could say that in the specific case of medical interventions to 
transform trans people’s bodies, unlike other forms of “dependance”, what is at stake is a specific 
desire which is understandable in terms of a “binaristic” demand that men should have a 
certain appearance and women, another. Therefore, demanding a medical intervention to 
transform one’s body in accordance with the self-perception of gender would be a way of 
yielding to that demand. It would be more autonomous, then, to resist such a “binaristic” 
demand and to accept one’s body as it is. 
 
2 Córdoba mentions Hausman as a support for this tenet. A careful discussion of, inter alia, the distinction 
between “the phenomenon of transsexualism” (Hausman 1995, xi), whose “emergence […] in the mid-
twentieth century depended on developments in endocrinology and plastic surgery as technological and 
discursive practices”, and “transsexuality”, as “a category of experience and identity” (Hausman 1995,  3) goes 








However, this would be a rather poor objection against the self-interpretation of trans 
people’s behavior vis-à-vis medicine as autonomous and “instrumental”—and it would be 
poor because it is ad hoc, not susceptible of generalization. As a general rule, when the 
personal desires at stake (desires that seem to involve no-one but oneself) are not those of 
trans people, it just does not seem acceptable to delegitimize them by “tracing” their origin 
in some sort of causal story. We find it preposterous when conservatives “explain” a 
person’s desire to perform an abortion, for example, by appealing to some story in which 
abortion-seeking people are merely pawns in some kind of international conspiracy to 
diminish the number of births in the Third World. When such an argument comes to the 
fore, the reply does not aim at whether or not it is desirable to diminish that number but, 
simply, at the fact that there are individuals who choose to perform an abortion, and that, as a 
consequence, access to abortion is a requisite to respect those individuals’ autonomy. 
Upholding people’s autonomy is, in these cases, a question of defending their possibility to 
fulfill the desires they in fact have, not an opportunity to dictate which desires they should have. 
 
Furthermore, it is quite ironic to find that Córdoba describes the voluntary act of trans people 
of modifying their bodies as some kind of submission to binaristic imperatives, insofar as 
this move would certainly prove too much: if deciding to transform one’s body somehow 
cannot be an autonomous act, why exactly would it be an exercise of autonomy to change 
other aspects of one’s identity, with the assistance of the law? Why would there be an 
enormous difference between the act of changing one’s name and that of changing one’s 
body? If, according to Córdoba, doing the latter amounts to yielding to binaristic 
imperatives, it is not clear why the same criticism would not apply to the case of changing a 
“female” name to a “male” one, or the other way round. (If, again, the huge difference 
between one act and the other is supposed to hinge on the fact that changing one’s body 
involves a recourse to medical technologies, then we return to the problem already tackled in 5.1: 
nearly everyone is in a way or another “dependent on” such technologies).  
 
Section 6: A Possible Desideratum and a Misplaced Demand 
 
Now, it could perhaps be agreed that it would be desirable to advance towards a society in 
which individuals are not publicly categorized as belonging to one of two main gender 
identities, as “men” or “women”, and in which, consequently, there is no room for a 
demand either to have a “male” or “female” appearance or to have a “male” or “female” name. 
In fact, in a society in which rights such as vote or education have ceased to be associated 
with masculinity, it can be demanded that membership in one of the groups or the other 
should become more a private affair (relevant only to one’s close relationships) than a public 
one, one about which state authorities need to have anything to say. Nevertheless, this 
demand for an increasingly gender-neutral society (that is to say, a society in which gender 
identities cease to have any public importance) can still be countered with two other 
considerations.  
 
First, it is not clear whether in such a future society “each person’s deeply felt internal and 
individual experience of gender”, as the Yogyakarta Principles describe it (International 
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ourselves as men or women (and this, of course, applies not only to trans people, but to cis 
people as well!), it is not at all clear why manifestations of such identities (in the form of 
physical appearance, names, and so on) should be banned. We cis people are usually not 
demanded to suppress every mark of masculinity and femineity—and therefore it would be 
rather odd to assume that trans people are obliged to carry the burden of performing such a 
task, failing which they are to be accused of reinforcing binarism.  
 
Second, and more obviously, we simply are not there yet. We do not live in a gender-neutral 
society, and trans people, just like cis people, are subjected to being classified as “men” or 
“women” depending on how they look. Given this fact, the possibilities they face are either 
being systematically misgendered, that is, classified as belonging to a group they do not 
identify themselves with, or modifying their names, appearances, and so on, in order to 
indicate how they perceive themselves and to guide the way in which they will (hopefully) be 
classed by others. Again: given that we cis people, living in a society which classes individuals 
as “men” or “women”, are not denied our right to have gender-laden appearances and 
names, it would be preposterous to demand that trans people act as if binaristic 
classifications had been overcome. 
 
Section 7: Summing Up: Beyond “Culpable Ignorance” 
 
It is time to recapitulate. While I agree with Radi’s overall criticism to Córdoba’s approach to 
gender identity, I believe that the core of the disagreement is not simply that Córdoba is 
ignorant of a series of factual reports made by trans people, which indicate that they have an 
“instrumental” (and, as such, autonomous) relationship with medical technologies. Instead, 
the key problem seems to be that Córdoba adopts a perspective from which the same 
actions that Radi describes as instances of “instrumental use” just cannot be regarded as 
autonomous behavior, but only cases of a “dependence” on the demands of a binaristic (and 
monolithic) “science”. Therefore, I believe that it is fruitful to reconsider what our criteria 
are when the autonomous character of behavior is at stake. It is on this ground, as I have 
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